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QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS FOR DECISIONS AT THE
FEDERAL RESERVE
BY JAMES L. PIl:R(E*
The purpose of this paper is to describe how policy analysis and aduice is made at the 1t'thra! Reserre'
Board cis well as to discuss the implications of the process for optimal control applications An attempt is
made to highlight those areas wiiee control applications might make the greatest contribution to improving
the pohci -making process. Some of the problems that haie' been emicoimmitered in using control techniques
at the Fedprohlents wflhi structural niode'ls and .spe'cibcation of objet-tire jumictiunsare pointed out
along with some' of tilt' insights that these applies Jtiofl.s have provided.
The way in which our work at the Fed hears on control theory applications can
probably best be illustrated by discussing how policy analysis and advice is
actually made at the Federal Reserve. To begin, it might he instructive to provide
a description of the policy-making process itself.
Every month in Washington. thcre is a meeting of the Federal Open Market
Commitiee(FOMC). which is the basic policymaking body of the Federal Reserve.
This Committee is composedofthe seven membersofthe Board of Governors
plus five Federal Reserve Bank presidents. l'he presidents of the remaining seven
Federal Reserve Banks also attend these meetings and freely enter into the discus-
sion, but do not vote. Thus, there are twelve voting members on the Committee.
Immediately, the severe problems involved in specifying an objective function for
monetary policy can be seen : there are twelve individuals with twelve separate
sets of preferences trying to reach a single decision. Somehow, however, decisions
do get made. The FOMC decides upon open market operationsthe purchases
and salesofGovernment securities, which are made daily in New York---that affect
directly commercial bank reserves in the economy. This is the primary vehicle
through which monetary policy operates.
In addition to the FOMC, the seven members of the Federal Reserve Board
formally meet together several times a week and--among their other duties
decide upon reserve requirements and approve discount rate changes. two addi-
tional monetary policy instruments. But because these actions are carefully
coordinated with the activities of the Committee, for purposes of this discussion,
the FOMC will be considered to be the ongoing policymaking body.
The staff periodically makes several kinds of presentation to the FOMC.
They will all be discussed in some detail here because each of them may provide
some insights for control applications.
Three or four times a year, depending on the behavior of the economy. a major
effort is made to prepare quarterly forecasts of the economy for the FOMC. These
usually run 4 to 6 quarters into the future. The forecasts are not extended any
further because generally not much credence is put in longer-run forecasting. I
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This basic lorecasi is conditional on explicit assumptions concerningmonctar'
policy.
To begin its analysis. the staff makes a con(Iilional forecast that coi)tains Some
kind of simple policy assumption. For instance. it may he assumed thata particular
growth path for the money stock will obtain during the period,or maybe a Simple
pattern in interest rates is taken as the policy. Given thiS basicassumption we run
our econometric modcl----vhich is our own version of the FM P(FRB- MIT-Penn)
modeland obtain a set of results after iudicious!y adjusting theconstant terms in
equations that have not been tracking well. These adjustmentscan he justified
as a means of building in prior information to make a conditional forecastfor a
specific future time period.
At the same time, another forecast Is being made h'judgmental means-- i.e.
without aid of a formal model. Judgmental forecastersat the Fed usually havea
very good feel for what is going on in theeconomy, and theoften make helter
short-term forecasts than the models do. Thejudgmental forecast iscompared to
the model forecast. The diflrences betweenthe two forecasts often leadto insights
and revisions in each forecast. Aconsensus forecast is then arrivedat that is a blend of the forecasts obtained fromthe two methods.
The consensus forecast providesfigures for such targetvariables as GNP and its major components, theunemployment rate, and therate of inflation. At this point, the quarterly model isadjusted in terms of interceptshifts in individual
equations so as to force itssectors and totals to agreequarter by quarter with the
consensus forecast. Once these adjustments are made. we run policyalternatives off of the adjusted form of themodel.
Hecause we normally donot have to adjust the modelvery far in order to make it agree with theconsensus forecast, these adjustmentshave virtually no effecton the multipliers in themodel, even though themodel is nonlinear. Thus,the policy alternatives applied to theadjusted form of the modelgive us. for all intentsand purposes, the same marginal effectsas would occur ifwe hadnot adjusted the model to begin with. Its multipliersare left intact, hut theadjustments allow us to talk about a common levelof the target variables.
The policy alternativesmay be for differentgrowth paths of amonetary aggregate, such as themoneystock or for differentpa(ternsofan interest rate. In the interests ofclarity, thisdiscussion will focuson the money stock. Alternativegrowth paths of the moneystock can be hand ledvery conveniently withour rico- Keynesian model. We usuallyrun several aIternati'esaneasier alternative,a tighter alternative, and thendifferent time paths inbetween. This givesthe FOMC some feel for what thetradeofts areamong importailt targetvariables such as employ- ment, output, and theinflation rate.










vilI react, and whether more oi less money ultimatelwill be spent. When un-
cci taintv about liscal polic\ is particularly pressing. we work Out various asSump-
tions about the lIscal sector to examine the implications for sonic given monelary
policy. In addition to the bothersome hscal sector, there are times when feel
uneasy about a particular co-determined variable, like inventory investment. At
that time, we may tn differeiit patterns of inventory mvestnient, again, to see what
the implications of variabiliv in that sector are for the selection of a particular
policy.
By the end of this process, the staffhas compiled a large number of alternatives,
However, there is a real limit to the number of alternatives tha can he presented to
any audience. A welter of detail seems to cause more confusion than assistance.
While the entire exercise is quite useful to the stai1 the presentation to the FOM C
must be more limited. Thus the staff determines what are the most crucial issues
at the time, and presents the results relevant to those issues.
On the basis of the staff's presentation and its own evaluation of events, the
FOMC sets a policy for the next six months or more in terms of, say. the growth
path of the money stock. lii principle. the i-OMC's longer-run strategy can he
updated each month : in practice, however, it does not change that often---for no
other reason than new and useful information does not arrive on a monthly basis.
While we do not go through a full-scale forecasting and policy alternative analysis
each month, we do update our forecast for each meeting based on the policy
trajectory previously chosen by the Committee and on an new data. As events
warrant, the FOMC does change its basic policy trajectory.
I would like to point out that while we have never formally presented an
optimal control solution to the F'OMC. we have produced such solutions for a
certainty version of our model. The outcome has been very useful in designing
policy alternatives and as background for policy advice. In the cases studied so far.
it has been possible to come very close to the optimal solution with some very
simple policy moves. One of our big fears had been that in the optimal solution, the
money stock or interest rates might explode right off the charts. Of course the
policymakers would not believe this sort of result. and probably rightfully so. In
fact, however, we have been able to come ver close to an optimal trajectory with
quite a gradual and smooth movement in the path of both interest rates and the
money stock. Thus, even in a rmidinlentary form. we have found these exercises to he
very helpful.
While the FOMC meets once a month, its open market operations go on daily.
Thus, every month, the C'onmniittee must decide upon its ''operating strategy.''
that is. it has to give instructions to the trading desk in New York. where securities
are actually bought and sold. as to what to do during the month that will lapse
before the next Committee meeting. These instructions are composed of two parts.
First, te Committee states its decision regarding its longer-run strategy. say ..some
growth path in the money stock. Then it must decide about how to return tile
targeted variablewhether the money stock or an interest rate--to the desired
path when it strays ofT course. For instance, the money stock is very rarely exactly
on course because it cannot be determined with complete accuracy. The FOMC's
decision on how quickly to bring the money stock hack towards the desired longer-
run path is not independent of its decision concerning tile variability in short-term
13interest rates that it will tolerateor vice versa. Thus, there ia tradeoff between
control of the money stock, or air,' other monetary aggregate, and variability of
short-term interest rates.
Each month the stall presents short-run operating strategy alternatives to the
FOMC in very much the same manner that it presents longer-run (iNP projections
Namely, we have a model, a form of which was described by Pindyck and Roberts
at this conference, that is used to generate monthly forecasts ofthc money market.
The forecasts are conditional on income estimates derived from the quarterly
forecast and on a specific patternofhank reserve growth. The forecasts fromthe
monthly model are blended with independent judgments (along with theresults
of other models) to arrive at a setofalternatives to present to the FOMç, For
instance, if the money stock is off track, then the alternatives are in the formof
various growth paths of hank reserves required to move the money stock from its
current value back to the desired long-run path over difThrent timehorizons.
Predictions ofthe implication for short-term interest rates ofthe variousalternatives
are also presented. The more quickly that the money stock is brought backto the
long-run path, the greater will he the niovemerit in interestrates, other things equal.
Since there is some concern about interestmovements in their own right, the
estimated tradeoff between hitting themoney stock target and movements in
interest rates are also presented. On the basis ofthis presentation and itsown
evaluation of the money market, the FOMCdecides on its short-run operating
strategy.
In general, the longer-runmovements in the money stock, orsome other
monetary aggregate, are viewed as stabilizing theeconomy (income, employment,
and inflation), and the shorter-runmovements, in part, are viewed as stabilizing
the money market (e.g., short-terminterest rates). Onecan think of the situation
in terms ofspectral analysis: thehigh frequencymovements in the money stockare really those used to stabilizethe money market and the lowfrequency onesare use to stabilize the economy. There isa conflict between thesemovements in the money stock, but the conflict neednot be very great so longas the money stock tends to fluctuate evenlyaround the long-run trajectory.Sometimes this is notso. and the money stockgets too far off the trajectoryto allow it to be returned inany short period of timewithout unacceptablemovements in interest rates. Asa result. longer-run stabilizationpolicy itself may he affected.Unfortunately for our purposes, the mnone' stock isnot solely set by the FederalReserve hut rather is co-determined in theeconomy: it is the path of bankreserves that is under policy control. While the stockof money is highlyinfluenced by Federal Reservepolicy. it is still difficult bothto predict and control.Furthermore, the money stockis not the only intermediatetarget for monetary policy:interest rates, credit conditions, etc. also compete forthe FOMC'sconsideration When theseother factors are given heavierweight, themoney stock can strayeven farther from its predetermined growth Path---perhaps.with no cost to theobjectives of policy. I would liketo suggest someimplications of theseprocedures for optimal control applicationsThe firstconcerns the use of an intermediatetarget variable as a means for obtainingthe ultimate endsofmonetary policy. The FOMC really makes two decisions:it makes thedecision as to what isthe preferred time path of the economyand then makesthe decisionas to what intermediatetarget. say. the
14growth path iii the money stock, will he consistent with this goal. In oilier words, it
aims at the money stock----or at other times interest rates- -asa vehicle for acconip-
lishing its ends with respect to the real sectors oftheeconorn.
It is not obvious that this is the appropriate thing to do. One is certainly
entitled to ask: why not go directly from the true instrilnients of policy topen market
operations, the discount rate, and reserve requirements) to the real economic
targets? Why go through this intermediate vehicle at all? Clearly, this sort of pro-
cedure would not make any sense in a world of certainty, where we knew the exact
c relationships between the instruments and the ultimate targets. To the contrary.
however, we operate in a world with a high degree of uncertainty. The rationale [or
r usingan intermediate target lies in the fact that its data are more frequently available
f than are data on the real sectors: movements in the intermediate target can provide
early information on how the real sectors are responding to policy. In addition. it
must be under some degree of policy control and it must he causally related to the
ultimate objectives of policy. Thus, the difficulty or ease with which a target for the
e money stock can he hit in a particular smtuation. presumably, indicates what is
happening in the real sectors. While this idea of using an intermediate target has
appeal, no one has proved that it is appropriate.
n One very useful application of optimal control procedures would be to analyze
the conditions tinder which it is desirable to use an intermediate target for mone-
tary policy. Furthermore, if these conditions are likely to exist, what is the best
intermediate target to use? If the conclusion were to be that ii is never or hardly
ever appropriate to use an intermediate target variable, then it is important to
know the costs incurred by pursuing one.
The next issue I want to discuss is uncertainty in general. Itis difficult to
overemphasize the degree of uncertainty with which policy decisions must be made.
A high degree of uncertainty concerning future values of exogenous variables is
one of the reasons why it is difficult to make reliable forecasts veryfar into the
e future. The forecasting errors in the exogenous variables become so large. or at
k least the variance around some expected value becomes so large, that the worth of
our GNP projections diminishes greatly as the forecast horizon is extended.
V Another area of uncertainty has to do with our models. I want to stress this
because users of control theory often tend to take models as given and work out
solutions without seriously questioning the reasonableness of the models. This
tendency is not very harmful when one is working on technique. However, there is
a real danger of giving more credence to model results than they deserve,especially
if a particular policy trajectory is highly influenced by the choice of a model.
The problem lies not only with uncertainty concerning the true value of
model parameters, but also with the structure of models themselves. I cannot state
with much certainty that we have a good approximation to the economy with our
d models at the Federal Reserve Board. I have even more doubt about other models
that arc used for policy analysis. My particular concern involves whether or not
'ml
we have correctly approximated the impact of monetary policy in themodels. For
example, we have found that with sonic relatively minor changes in the specifica-
tion of our quarterly model--changing just three or four equations--we can
importantly alter its policy multipliers: I believe this is true of other models as
ie
well. A couple of examples should make the point.
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We have a wide variety ofinoticy demand functions from whrdì We Llfl thoo'
all estimated with about the same R2, with about thesame standard error ofetj
mate, and all about as intuitively sensible or unserisible as the other. However the
results from the full model are quite different just because of he different interest
elasticities of money demand implied by these functions. ille way that thisand
other structural models work is to unpose clearing in the inOnemarket short-
term interest rates ni ust move sir flIcien i ly tO eq nate money deni and withilloiley
supply. Other things equal, the smaller the short-run interestelasticity of motley
demand, the greater the movement in interest rates required to induce tilepublic to
change its holdings of money balances by a given amount. Fora given change in the
growth in the money stock, different money demand functions withtheir diflrent
elasticities will imply different changes in short-term interestrates. The changesin
short rates then feed to longer-term rates, to wealth, andto spending Thus, the
short--run impact ofa change in the money stock predicted by themodel will depend
rather crucially on the money demand function selected. Attills tulle, We simply
have no reliable guidelines to help us chooseamong tile functions available
Another example is provided by the model'scOnsunlpliori function. Tlieorctic_
ally, consumption should dependupon wealth and it does in our model.tinfortu- nately. as soon as we have consumptiondependent upon wealth,we have to
predict the impact of monetary policyon tile stock market, because tilemajor
component of the variance in wealth is the variance instock prices. Givena choice,
I think any of us would far preferto just go ahead and forecastconsumption than to forecast the stock market. However,because we would be losinga major channel
through which monetary policyworks b' leaving wealthout, we leave it in. We
then have all kinds of ad Jim-procedures for explaining the stockmarket. The way tilat the stock market isspecilied to adjust tomonetary policy variables is crucial
to estimating the impact of thesevariables on consumption arid,hence, GNP. Again we have no reliablemeans of selecting the "correct"specification Another question Iwant w raise is, what isan acceptable way of evaluatinga model? I-low do we knowwhen it is right? Thereare many models that explain their sample period well and alsodo pretty well outsidethe sample period, hutwhich differ drastically intheir specifications andalso in their implied policymultipliers. Unfortunately, there isno very reliable method ofchoosing among alternative models. In a relatedvein, we have learnedthat individualstructural equations might look sensible,but when theyare put together in a Itnll Illodel.tiley can give some very strange results.Thus, it becomesvery difficult to know whenan equation is good ornot. Should it be judgedas an individual equationor ill terms of how it contributed to the fullmodel?
An excellentcase in point hasto do with stability ofmodis. Should one impose stabilityon a model or not'? Bystability. I mean if thenlodel is shocked Witil. say, a permanentchange in tilegrowth rate of thenione stock, does tIle Illodelo through explosivecycles'? The realworld might he likethat. hut then againit niay not. It is not possibleto know because thereal world nevergets shocked in the Wil) that modelsare shocked Instabilitypci- se does not botherCoiltrol theorists be- cause they pointout that thesystem can he stabilizedeven though it is structurally unstable. Perhaps thatmay he what happensin the econonly.Perhaps the economy is inherentlyunstable but policyat least has beengood enoughonerage to keep
16it from exploding. Itis difficith to determine where the truth lies. Theproblem is
clearly an importantone because the kind of stability conditions imposed willhave
implications for a model's dynamic policymultipliers. It seems fair to say that there
is no firm basis for knowing whatkind of stability conditionsto impose on Our
models, if any.
There is an additional problem thatplagues any 115cr of models for forecasting
and policy analysis. There isno solid basis for establishing a practical method of
incorporating prior information intomodels. This information comes from such
sources as recent performance of the model,judgmental assessments of the
economy, and special survey information.Adjustments of a model's constant
terms is a rough and ready way to deal with thisproblem, but the method is clearly
deficient. Slope coefficientsas well as intercepts should he adjusted whenappro-
priate. The developnient of better proceduresfor incorporating prior information
would provide a major contributionto policy analysis.
At this point I would like to offera few comments about the objective function
used in the formulation ofmonetary policy. As mentioned earlier, it is particularly
difficult to talk about "the'' objective functionbecause there are really twelve
objective functions on the FOMC. and therehas to be a majority of peopleon the
Committee to agree on policy. The differentways that the Committee members
grapple with uncertainty often conditiondisagreements more than their basic
underlying objectives. For instance, ifsomeone places a high weight on avoiding
high inflation rates, lie will hevery worried that somehow future inflation rates
have been underestimated. 1-Ic will be willingto pay a relatively high penalty, in
terms of higher expected unemploymentrates, in order to avoid a bad draw in the
sense of getting inflation rates greater than anticipated. Thesame sort of argument
applies to a member who is worried aboutunemployment. Being central bankers
and being in a position where decisions haveto be made, the Committee members
are risk aversethey are willing to trade off expected valuefor decrease in variance.
Their aversion to risk often takes the formof restricting movements in policy
instruments. This occurs not because instrumentstability is necessarily valued per
.se, but rather stems from a fear of going outside therange of experience. These
particular restrictions, then, donot belong in the objective function. By restricting
movements in its instruments, the FOMC has ina sense solved its own control
problem. I think there is too muchtendency on the part of researchers doing
control applications simply toassume that there should be a penalty coston
movements in the instruments, and then justify thisassumption by observing that
the instruments, in fact, have not movedvery much in the real world. This procedure
precludes us from ever being ableto demonstrate whether or not themovements
have been too restrictive.
For monetary policy, there really isno cost (in an economic resource sense) of
large movements in thereserve instrument. ft is no more costly to buya billion
dollars of Government securitiesper unit than to buy a thousand dollars worth,
and there are probably great scale economies.Thus, movements in bankreserves
do not belong in the objective function.It is true that policymakersworry about
short-term variability of interestrates and, at times, about the level ofrates. These
interest rate considerations shouldappear in the objective function, or at leastas
side conditions in a control problem.
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Three additional observations concerning objective functions may he iii order
at this point. First, it is very difficult to convince a policymaker tO fl1O'e an instru-
ment in what he views to be the wrong direction. i'hat is to say, if income is expand-
ing very rapidly and the models are predicting that it is going to fall in (lie future
unless he eases up, it is very difficult to get him to ease up because that sort ofpolicy
recommendation is contrary to what is going on currently. I mustSay that until our
models do a lot better, his wariness may be justified. Again, the problem isone of
how to handle risk: what if the model were wrong? What if theeconomy were
expanding very rapidly, the policymaker eases up, but economic expansionbecomes
more rapid? The cost of the error to the policymaker would he very large.
Second, I have observed over time that risk aversionon the part of the
policymakers leads to risk aversion on the part of those giving advice.The reason
is very simple: if advice is followed and it turns out to bewrong, the policyniakers
probably will not listen next time. Thus, the people giving advicealso have a loss
function that further compounds the risk aversion. Asa result, policy advice
often goes only part way. trying to point policy in whatappears to he the right
direction. Contrary to the opinion ofsoine observers,policy advisers are not inthe
habit of recommending "fine tuning" of theeconomy.
Third, for optimal control studies,we need to know how crucial theweights
are in the loss function. We have done a few optimal controlexperiments in this
area using our quarterly model: they indicate thatat least for some initial condi-
tions, the choice of weights isnot very important. In theseexperiments wide
variations in the relative weights assignedto (lie uneniployment rate and therate of inflation resulted in surprisinglysimilar optimal policy trajectories.The reason
that this result occurs is that the inflationrate responds much less rapidlyto changes in policy variables than does theunemployment rate. In the longerrun, however. the effect of monetary policy ismuch more powerfulon the rate of inflation. Thus,
even if the unemployment rate receivesa relatively large weight in theobjective function, an attemptto bring it quickly back totarget will set in train forces leading ultimately toa relatively large rise in inflationabove its target. Thus,so long as the inflationrate receives a weight in theobjective function, it will reduce the incentive tomove the unemploymentrate quickly to its desired value,although some movement is desirable. Inthe longer run, small changesin the unemployment rate are associated with relativelylarge changes in therate of inflation. so again the inflation rate mustenter importantly incomputing the loss. This would bea very powerful result if itheld for a large numberof initial Conditions It wouldindicate that researcherswould not have toworry so much about getting thecorrect weights in the objectivefunction. The resultwould also be a demonstrationof the robustnessof the technique ofoptimal control. If it turned out that thetechnique dependedcrucially on these weights,however, then it becomes muchweaker becausewe really have no wayofknowing what the weights are.








































problems. The Federal Reserve only hac about twoor three instruments, so we are
not terribly interested in looking at results where sixty different instruments can
be varied. It would be extremely productive if we could talk ina more meaningful
was' about movements in real output, employment, and inflation in response to
variations in one instruriient. There probably isa very substantial payoff to
working with smaller models that describe the behavior of thosetwo or three
target variables and their relation to a policy instrument. The useofsmall models
would clear away a great dealofthe pure technical problems, particularly in
stochastic control problems. It is not at all clear to me that larger modelsare
needed in order to carry out this kindofexperiment. In fact, we are currently
engaged in efforts to come up with a scaled down versionofour own quarterly
model. Hopefully, we will then be able to do control problems more efficiently
than we have been able to do in the past.
I would like to conclude by saying that i'inc work on optimal control is
very promising, and our applied work at the Fed indicates that control techniques
can and willprovide important contributions toward solving stabilization
problems.
Boarl of Goi'ernors0/
the Federal Reserre System
19